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HOW LONG FOR DYNASTY TRUSTS?
— by Neil E. Harl*
In recent years, interest by planners and others in so-
called “dynasty” trusts has increased.1  Enactment of the
revised generation skipping transfer tax in 19862 has
apparently not dampened enthusiasm for such trusts.
One interesting development in state property law, the
repeal by a few states of the common law or statute-
based Rule Against Perpetuities, promises to add to the
interest level in dynasty trusts.3
Nature of dynasty trusts
As the name suggests, “dynasty” trusts are designed
to hold property in trust for a relatively long period of
time, with the duration typically constrained only by the
Rule Against Perpetuities.  The $1,000,000 exemption
from the generation skipping transfer tax4 acts as a
second constraint on the creation of a dynasty trust.  The
exemption may be allocated to any one or more transfers
and has the effect of exempting, from the outset, all or
part of the property involved.5  Allocation of the
exemption is made automatically by statute if not
allocated otherwise by the transferor.6  Once allocated to
a transfer, the exemption, in effect, shields all direct skip
transfers,7  taxable distributions8  and taxable
terminations9 resulting from that transfer for its entire
duration.
Under a typical dynasty trust, a tract of land
approaching $1,000,000 in value is transferred to a trust
formed specifically for that purpose.  The trust usually
specifies that beneficiaries in the first generation
following the grantor are to receive income from the
trust with beneficiaries in the second or later generations
following that of the grantor holding the remainder
interest.  Frequently, land which has been in the family
for a relatively long time is selected for inclusion in the
trust.
Limits on duration
The duration of a dynasty trust or other generation
skipping trust is generally limited by the Rule Against
Perpetuities.10  Under the common law version of the
Rule, all interests in a trust must vest within the term of
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a class of lives in being plus 21 years.11
The Rule was developed in response to the creation
by property owners several centuries ago of successive
life estates which would have reduced dramatically the
transferability of land.  The courts reasoned that creation
of successive life estates for very long time periods or
into perpetuity would cut down on the amount of land
available for transfer.
The common law version of the rule is still followed
in 22 states.  Those states include Alabama, Arkansas,
the District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming.
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
(USRAP)12 has been adopted in 24 states.  Under
USRAP, an interest is valid if— (1) it will necessarily
vest or fail within lives in being plus 21 years (basically
the common law rule) or (2) the interests actually vest
within 90 years of creation of the interests.
Four states--South Dakota,1 3 Wisconsin, 14
Delaware,15 (as to personal property in trust)16 and
Idaho17 --have repealed the Rule Against Perpetuities for
trusts in which the trustee has the power to sell trust
assets.  In states which have repealed the Rule, there is
no apparent limitation on the term of dynasty trusts.
Those states essentially permit perpetual private trusts.
Which state law governs
The repeal in some states18 of the Rule Against
Perpetuities raises the question of which law governs
trusts established as dynasty trusts.  While repeal may
well represent a calculated effort to attract trust business
to the state, trusts holding land are generally governed
by the law of the state where the land is located.19
Tax consequences of perpetual trusts
Under the regulations, if a trust is extended beyond
the period allowed by the Rule Against Perpetuities, the
GSTT exemption is lost and the transfer is subject to
federal gift or estate tax.20  The regulations do, however,
permit the exercise of a power of appointment to convert
the term of a dynasty trust from the common-law
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perpetuities period to 90 years without adverse tax
consequences.21  The regulations do not address the
situation of perpetual trusts.  Some believe that trusts
governed by the law of a state which has abolished the
Rule continue to be free of generation skipping tax as
well as estate and gift tax so long as a donee does not
exercise a special power of appointment.22
In conclusion
For those wishing to take steps to assure that assets
remain within the family, a dynasty trust may be an
appealing alternative.  Additional states are expected to
join the ranks of those that have acted to permit the
organization of trusts on a perpetual basis.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The taxpayer was a
corporation which had filed for Chapter 11 on June 1,
1990. The debtor alleged that the IRS violated the
automatic stay in filing levies against the debtor’s assets
and the debtor was entitled to damages, including attorney
fees. The court held that, under Section 362(h), only
individuals were entitled to sue for damages for violations
of the automatic stay. In addition, the court held that the
debtor failed to show any violation of the automatic stay.
In re Material Corp., Inc., 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 case on
May 10, 1993. The debtor had filed an income tax return
for 1991 in November 1992. The Chapter 13 case was
dismissed 85 days later, prior to confirmation of the plan
or any payments to creditors. The debtor filed the current
Chapter 7 case on January 25, 1996, more than three years
after the filing of the tax return for 1991. The IRS argued
that the three year period of Section 507(a)(8) was tolled
during the first Chapter 13 case, such that less than three
years passed before the Chapter 7 filing, for the purposes
of Section 507(a)(8). The court noted a conflict in the
courts on this issue and held, with the majority of courts,
that the Chapter 13 case tolled the limitation period of
Section 507(a)(8). The court reasoned that a literal
interpretation of Section 507(a)(8) would allow debtors to
manipulate the process to remove a tax liability by filing
one case, waiting for a sufficient period and filing a
second case more than three years after the tax return. The
court did not discuss the opposing view that the IRS still
has sufficient time to make an assessment and preserve
the priority of the claim during the more than two years
between the bankruptcy filings in this case. In re
McMillan, 204 B.R. 835 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1996).
The debtor originally filed a Chapter 13 case which
was converted to Chapter 11. The case was dismissed
after the court revoked the Chapter 11 plan.  The debtor
later filed a Chapter 7 case more than three years after the
timely filing of a tax return for 1987. The debtor failed to
pay the 1988 taxes, however. After the debtor received a
discharge in Chapter 7, the IRS applied against the 1987
taxes a refund claimed by the debtor. The debtor argued
that the taxes were discharged in the Chapter 7 case
because the return was filed more than three years before
the Chapter 7 petition. The IRS argued that the Chapter
13/11 case tolled the three year limitation period of
Section 507(a)(8). The court held that the limitation
period was tolled by the Chapter 13/11 case because
Section 507(a)(8) was intended by Congress to give the
IRS three full years to make a collection of taxes. In re
Waugh, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,304 (8th Cir.
1997), aff’g, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,576 (D.
Minn. 1995).
The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 7 case in
which the IRS had filed a secured claim for taxes,
